



The electronics value-chain in an evolving geopolitics landscape





Economic analysis within the ICOS project – 2023/2024



Comparative Analysis of Semiconductor Ecosystems Worldwide, 2024





Ecosystems of 8 countries



- Market (by segment)
- Production (across the value-chain)
- trade
- Investments
- Policy strategies (chips acts)
- Strengths & dependencies
- Roadmap for cooperation (confidential)



Report "Monitoring Semiconductor Value Chains: Implications for International Cooperation"

- To be published in July 2025
- Goal: To monitor key factors affecting cooperations since 2024:
 - Geopolitical shifts and trade dynamics
 - > Deployment of investment plans along the value chain
 - Evolution of the European talent gap





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- 1. The globalized semiconductor value-chain: State of play in 2025
- 2. 1990s 2020s: A shifting Geopolitical Environment
- 3. Semiconductor: China's Rise and U.S. Industrial Policy Tools Aimed at Containment
- 4. Status of trade in semiconductor in this changing environment





(1)

Overview of the Semiconductor Industry

The World's Most Globalized Sector



Semiconductor front-end manufacturing installed capacities





Semiconductor Landscape in 2024





Positioning of the EU compared to other global countries in the global semiconductor value chain in terms of market share and production share









(2)

1990s – 2020s

A shifting Geopolitical Environment



27 years of globalization in a unipolar World (1991-2018)





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The Road to Multipolarity (2000-2023)



(2018-2024)

Towards a logic of blocks? The West versus the Rest?







Since 2025 – A World of Fragmentation & Multipolarity



The Road Ahead Regionalization and Progressive Decoupling of the Semiconductor Value Chain



- Export control, export bans, tariffs...
- For 5-10 years, companies start implementing **local-for-local manufacturing strategies**
 - ➢ At least for the U.S. and Chinese markets
 - Often for each country
- U.S. relocating manufacturing outside Taiwan to weaken its Silicon shield (US Chips act, ITSI, OECD, tariffs...)
 - ➤ Taiwan silicon shield will remain at least up to 2035
 - China & Taiwan could re-unify somewhere between 2040-2060?
- Towards at least 2 value-chains (US versus Chinese)





(3)

Semiconductor

The rise of China...

...and US attempts to contains China's rise





In **2015**, China published its plan "**Made in China 2025**" where it officially announce for the first time its willingness to master the complete value chain of semiconductor.





(5)

Status of trade in semiconductor

in this changing environment





- **Global trade** flattening since 2024
- **Semiconductor trade** flattening since 2024
 - US-China trade declining since 2018
 - **EU-China trade** growing above the average since 2015
- +€10B EU trade balance along the semiconductor value-chain
 - -€10B for semiconductor products
 - +€20B for equipment & tools
- **Main EU trading** partners (accounting for 70% of EU semiconductor trade)
 - 1. China 4. Malaysia (strong EU back-end manufacturing base)
 - 2. The USA 5. South Korea
 - 3. Taiwan 6. Japan





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Confirmed Semiconductor Investments Along the Value Chain Exceeding €1 Billion by Country/Region – May 2025



Source: DECISION Etudes & Conseil, May 2025 (China estimated)



Confirmed Semiconductor Investments Along the Value Chain Exceeding €1 Billion by Country/Region – May 2025



EU Chips Act – Investment Overview





Source: DECISION Etudes & Conseil



EU Chips Act - Key investments in the EU (>1B€) in 2025









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EU semiconductor talent gap (2024-2030), October 2024









2022

- Chips shortage & subsidies race EU target of 20% production share by 2030
- Talent gap: 350,000 workers lacking by 2030 (PwC)

2024

- Realistic investments forecasts by 2030
- Talent gap: 75,400 workers lacking by 2030 (DECISION) => 12,600 per year across the EU

2025

- €45B investments cancelled or delayed + downcycle of the European market (-8% 2024)
- At least -7000 employees needed
- Talent gap: 56,000 workers lacking by 2030 (DECISION) => 9,300 per year across EU





- In parallel to the difficult European market situation...
- The shortage of skills talent remains in the EU, particularly acute in specific clusters:
 - Need new targeted Masters:' programmes (electrical engineering, design...)
 - > Need to build new carrier pipes for electrical engineering teachers in specific universities
 - Lack of student interest in targeted countries (e.g., France, Italy...)
 - ▶ ...

Opportunities for cooperation

• Realistic investments forecasts by 2030





1) Exchange of PhD students and researchers with third countries on topics of mutual interest

- Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan...
- 2) India and Southeast Asia are the two regions with the greatest surplus of graduates in semiconductor-related fields.
- 3) Within the EU27, **Spain, Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Croatia** have the largest surplus of electrical engineering graduates relative to the current size of their national semiconductor ecosystems.
- 4) In the EU's immediate neighborhood, **Turkey** and **Morocco** also show a significant surplus of electrical engineering graduates compared to the scale of their semiconductor sectors.





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